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weighted average cost of liabilities to measure banks’ effective funding costs we show a model of 
interest rate pass-through with dynamic panel data methods solves this puzzle, and has many other 
advantages over traditional approaches. It confirms central banks should focus on the cost and 
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Abstract 
After the global finance crisis, policy rates were cut to near-zero levels, yet, bank lending rates 
did not fall as much as the decline in policy rates would have suggested. If the crisis represents a 
structural break in the relationship between monetary policy and lending rates, how should 
central banks view the post-crisis transmission?  This poses a major puzzle for monetary 
policymakers. Using a new weighted average cost of liabilities to measure banks’ effective 
funding costs we show a model of interest rate pass-through with dynamic panel data methods 
solves this puzzle, and has many other advantages over traditional approaches. It confirms 
central banks should focus on the cost and composition of bank liabilities, as many are now doing, 
to better understand and steer the dynamics of lending rates.   
 
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis prompted central banks in many countries to cut policy rates to near 
zero levels after the Lehman collapse in September 2008. Based on the pre-crisis relationship 
between bank lending rates on mortgages or loans to businesses with policy rates, it would have 
been reasonable to expect lending rates to have fallen by similar amounts. Yet lending rates did 
not fall that much, and in some vulnerable European countries they actually rose (Von Borstel et 
al., 2016, ECB 2016, Hristov et al. 2016). In addition, the margins over policy rates widened as 
policy rates fell (see Graph 1).2 Inevitably the question has been raised by academics and policy 
makers whether banks were taking advantage of the low interest rate environment by failing to 
pass on lower rates to loans.3,4 A related question is whether a structural break has occurred in 
the relationship between policy rates and lending rates set by banks requiring a re-evaluation of 
the determinants of lending rates. Central banks now puzzle over whether the transmission 
between policy actions and lending rates needs to be revisited in the light of an apparent 
disconnect between the two (see ECB, 2012; Beirne, 2012; ECB, 2013; Hristov et al., 2016; Von 
                                                          
2 Comparing the average margins on short-term and long-term loans to small business for nine Euro area countries, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom in the pre-crisis (January 2003 – August 2008) and post-crisis period (September 2008 
– April 2014) shows that they rose by 19.5%, while margins on short-term and long-term mortgage loans rose by 41.8% 
and 37.5% respectively. 
3 For example, Arestei and Gallo (2014) argue that since the financial crisis greater risk and high volatility has decreased 
the influence of policy rates (or market rates which they use as a proxy for policy rates) over lending rates. They then 
conclude that this reflects ‘opportunistic behaviour by banks, which [have taken] advantage of the reduction in official 
interest rates without transferring these benefits to borrowers’. (p292, Arestei and Gallo, 2014).  
4 In Ireland, Michael Noonan, the Finance Minister, called in the chief executive officers of the major Irish Banks to 
investigate concerns about relatively high rates being charged to borrowers in certain segments of the mortgage market 
(Irish, Times, 14 September 2015) 
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Borstel et al., 2016). The behaviour of bank lending rates during a period when the monetary 
stance was exceptionally loose but sovereign and credit risk were elevated (Beirne and 
Fratzscher, 2013) has now become a major policy issue (see Goggin et al. 2012; Albertazzi et al. 
2014; Arnold and van Ewijk, 2014; Darracq-Paries et al. 2014; De Sola Perea and Van 
Nieuwenhuyze, 2014; Holton and Rodriguez, 2015), not least because many countries in Europe 
have a high degree of bank dependence.5  
In this paper, we present evidence that a new weighted average cost of liabilities measure 
reflecting the actual funding costs of banks displays a more stable relationship with bank lending 
rates than the corresponding relationship with policy rates. It does not break down after the 
crisis, and explains why lending rates remained high when policy rates fell. This has refocused 
attention on the cost and composition of bank funding as a means to understand interest rate 
pass-through (ECB, 2015; ECB, 2016) and to explain persistent real interest differentials that 
reinforce cyclical differences in monetary transmission through the investment channel 
(European Commission, 2016).  
The main contribution of the paper is to focus attention on the whole range of liabilities 
that banks use to acquire funds (see Adrian et al. 2013; Turner, 2013). We do this by comparing 
the response of new business lending rates to the weighted-average cost of liabilities and 
separately to the individual components that are used in its construction.6 Most other studies, as 
Von Borstel et al. (2016) note, ‘rely on money market rates such as the EONIA (Euro OverNight 
Index Average) as a measure for monetary policy, neglecting the effects of unconventional 
monetary policy’. In this paper, we aim to correct this shortcoming by looking at all types of 
funding and their associated costs. To be clear about our methods, we multiply the cost of 
liabilities by the corresponding share of the liabilities on the banks’ balance sheets (excepting 
equity for reason given later) in every period to create a marginal cost of funds that can be related 
to the new business rates offered by banks to firms and households.  
We devote the first part of the paper to careful construction of the weights using 
information form the banks’ balance sheets. The new marginal cost of funds we construct can 
vary over time as weights or funding costs change. We then investigate the relationship between 
lending rates on new business, our new marginal cost of funds and policy rates over the period 
2003 – 2017 for European countries in the euro area (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
                                                          
5 Bank loans comprise some 50 percent of loans to firms and 90 percent of loans to households in Europe according to 
Von Borstel et al (2016).  
6 The weighting schemes adopted average across liability types, and not over time.  
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Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and those outside of the euro area (Denmark and the 
United Kingdom) using state-of-the-art non-stationary dynamic heterogeneous panel models 
initially developed by Peseran and Smith (1995) and Peseran, Shin and Smith (1999), but more 
recently extended by Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015). Previous panel approaches 
to model interest rate pass-through c.f. Sorensen and Werner (2006), and Hristov et al. (2016) 
found evidence of incomplete pass-through but without taking into account cross-country 
dependence between countries as we do, which is likely to be more important in the most recent 
period of financial and sovereign debt crises (see Von Borstel et al., 2016).  Von Borstel et al. 
(2016) provide a factor-augmented VAR, which assesses the responses of a large number of 
country-specific interest rates and spreads reflecting banks’ funding risks and mark-ups over 
bank funding costs. 
Our paper establishes that the lending rates, policy rates and funding costs co-move in the 
period up to the crisis, but the relationship breaks down after extending the sample with post-
crisis data. This relationship cannot be restored by simply allowing for structural breaks at the 
time of the crisis. Yet the relationship between lending rates and funding costs is stable for the 
full sample, spanning the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, supporting the pass-through findings 
by Holton and Rodriguez (2015) and Von Borstel et al. (2016). 7 Tests of robustness reveal a 
stable relationship with some small reduction in the reported pass-through coefficients by about 
10 percent as we progressively extend sample into the post-crisis period, and a more substantial 
reduction by about 33 percent in the speed of adjustment. We are also able to identify stable 
relationships between the lending rates and some individual components of the WACL, which 
shed light on the channels of monetary transmission for different lending rates. These findings 
have important implications for central banks’ understanding of the monetary transmission 
mechanism and regulation of banks in the post crisis period, not least because they contribute to 
persistent real interest differentials (European Commission, 2016). 
                                                          
7 Von Borstel et al (2016) also construct an average measure of bank funding costs, which is then employed to assess the 
transmission of monetary policy shocks to lending rates in a FAVAR framework in two samples, a pre-crisis sample and a 
sovereign debt crisis sample excluding the global financial crisis. They include in their FAVAR a monetary policy rate a 
dummy variable for announcements of unconventional monetary policy factors representing country-level bank lending 
rates and decompositions of the spreads over risk free rates to allow for sovereign and bank specific risk and markups. 
They conclude that monetary transmission did not change (during the sovereign debt crisis versus the pre-crisis period), 
but neither did it reduce the gap between bank loan rates and funding costs, which remained elevated. Our paper seeks 
to establish the stability of the connection between funding costs and lending rates for 11 euro area and non-euro area 
countries, while theirs seeks to compare the impact of conventional and unconventional monetary policy in the euro 
area on several different loan-policy spread components using a wider array of variables in two sample periods (pre 
financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis).  
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How do we explain these results? Our contention is that while policy rates were a 
reasonable proxy for funding costs in the pre-crisis period, because liquidity and counterparty 
risks were low and stable, they ceased to be a good proxy for funding costs once the financial 
crisis occurred (see Goggin et al. 2012; Albertazzi et al 2014; Arnold and van Ewijk, 2014; De Sola 
Perea and Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2014; Holton and Rodriguez, 2015).8 The policy rate is not an 
accurate representation of the marginal cost of funds for banks after 2007 when the cost of funds 
from the impaired interbank market diverged from policy rates. Since the global financial crisis 
larger risk premia associated with securities issued by banks and interbank borrowing have 
raised the cost of market funding for banks (see ECB, 2009, 2010a,b; Zoli, 2013) illustrated by 
the divergence of bond yields across borders, which has reversed the trend of lower and more 
similar rates since the late 1990s (ECB, 2012). The sovereign debt crisis limited the ability of 
governments to recapitalise their banks as their own debt increased, widening bond spreads 
further (ECB, 2012). In addition, mark-downs on deposit rates, which would normally be below 
policy rates, have been constrained by the zero lower bound. On top of that, there has been 
greater competition among banks for term deposits, which further raised these rates, as higher-
yield assets such as fixed-term securities issued by governments have increasingly been seen as 
substitutes for low-yielding deposits by savers (see Darracq-Paries et al. 2014, and Von Borstel 
et al., 2016). Some of these effects have been addressed by targeted long-term refinancing 
operations (TLTROs in the Euro area and Funding for Lending in the UK) and asset purchase 
programmes (APP and QE in the euro area and the UK respectively) as discussed in Churm and 
Radia (2012) and ECB (2015, 2016).  
There are significant implications for monetary policy operation and transmission from 
our findings as greater attention is given to the cost and composition of bank funding as a means 
to understand interest rate pass-through (ECB, 2016). The implications of financial 
fragmentation contribute to different nominal lending rates, even in a common monetary area, 
and these may create persistent real interest differentials that reinforce cyclical differences in 
monetary transmission through the investment channel (European Commission, 2016). By 
understanding the components of bank funding costs that are elevated, it is also possible for 
policymakers to focus non-standard monetary policy on those markets to lower funding costs 
(ECB, 2015). 
                                                          
8 The empirical literature on pass-through represented by Borio and Fritz (1995), De Bondt (2002, 2005), Ehrmann et al 
(2003) Hofmann and Mizen (2004) has used policy rates or money market rates to explain short-term lending rates, and 
has used longer-dated, often maturity-matched yields on securities to explain longer-term loans. An exception in this 
respect is De Bondt et al. (2005) which refers to the cost of funding measured by short-term and long-term market rates, 
and our paper follows in that tradition, but uses information from bank balance sheets to structure the funding costs.  
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  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model to 
frame our results. Section 3 discusses the construction of the weighted average cost of liabilities, 
including details on the data sources and their characteristics. This new measure of average 
funding costs is the cornerstone of our empirical analysis. In Section 4 we show that the 
relationship between lending rates and policy rates breaks down. Section 5 shows the 
relationship to funding costs is stable and robust. Section 6 investigates the dynamic aspects of 
the relationship between monetary policy and bank funding costs. Section 7 discusses the policy 
implications and concludes. 
 
2. An Illustrative Model and Some Background Literature 
To set our empirical analysis in a theoretical framework, we consider a simple illustrative model 
based on Berlin and Mester (1999) [hereafter BM], which considers the contracting relationship 
between a firm and a bank. The core feature of the model is the setting of lending rates subject to 
the liability structure of the bank. It shows that lending rates should be related to the liability 
structure of the bank, but it does not extend this observation to more than market funds and 
deposits. We argue in this section that the set of liabilities should be greatly enlarged to account 
for the diverse sources of funds that banks use to fund their activities.  
In BM, the decisions of the firm and the bank are made over two periods, 0 and 1. The state 
of the world in period 1 is unknown to the bank or the firm, and it can be good (g) or bad (b):    
s ϵ {g, b}. The probability of a good period is p, and of a bad period (1-p). Firms have positive 
earnings in good times, Eg>0, and no earnings in bad times, Eb=0. The state is revealed at the start 
of period 1 and the economic conditions are observable to all parties. It is assumed that the firm 
must borrow from the bank to invest, or liquidate some of its assets A(k), where k ϵ [0, K]; this 
reduces the future value of the firm in order to generate liquid assets in the present.  
 The BM bank has a representative liability structure: deposits and market funds are held 
in proportions w and (1-w). Certain restrictions are assumed: the cost of funding is state 
dependent and higher in bad times (Cb > Cg); the expected value of market funds exceeds the cost 
of core deposits, the cheapest available source of funding. Shares of certain liabilities can be zero. 
Further assumptions ensure earnings in good times cover the returns to depositors (Eg > Cg), 
although in bad times liquidation is required, since Cb > 0. The capital, K, is always larger than the 
weighted average cost of liabilities (1) even in the bad state of the world. These assumptions 
ensure that liquidation levels in good times are zero, and in bad times are just sufficient to cover 
the cost of liabilities for the bank., Lb. 
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 The BM bank and firm both maximise profits, defined in each case as revenue minus costs 
in each state of the world times the probability that each state of the world will occur. Thus 
])()[1(])([ ggggbbbb
f rkAkEprkAkEp        (1) 
])1([)1( gb
l
g
l
b
b LppLrppr          (2) 
where rls is the lending rate of interest for s ϵ {b, g}, and ks is the liquidation level. The bank faces 
Bertrand competition in the loan market, treats its liability structure as given in the present 
period, and maximises its own profits, which results in a lending rate equal to the weighted 
average cost of liabilities defined in each state of the world9: 
                        (3)  
In this framework, pass-through occurs between the weighted average cost of liabilities and the 
loan rates, not the policy rate and loan rates.  Lending rates will be lower in good times than in 
bad times because the cost of funds will be lower in good times than bad times, but the pass-
through in each state of the world will be complete, since  
𝑑𝑟𝑠
∗
𝑑𝐿𝑠
= 1 for 𝑠 𝜖 {𝑏, 𝑔}. However, in the 
transition from model to testable hypotheses, BM admit that a bank may protect its borrowers 
(making a smaller increase to its markup) during bad times if it has a higher level of core deposits, 
ensuring that the pass-through is less than complete. This hypothesis is upheld, breaking the full 
pass through assumption, but this does not break the connection between lending rates and the 
cost of liabilities of the bank. 
The modelling framework described above stands in contrast with the assumptions 
behind the majority of the empirical literature, i.e. that banks obtain funds for short-term lending 
at contemporary market rates (or policy rates), while longer term lending rates on mortgages or 
business lending are funded by 5- or 10-year sovereign bond yields (as a proxy for longer term 
market finance for banks). There is little discussion about deposit rates or the liability structure 
of banks, despite extensive discussion of pass-through by banks (see Borio and Fritz, 1995; De 
Bondt, 2002; Ehrmann et al. 2003; Hofmann and Mizen, 2004; De Graeve et al. 2007;  ECB, 2009; 
Kwapil and Sharler, 2010; Kopecky and Van Hoose, 2012; Banerjee et al. 2013; and Darracq-
Paries et al., 2014).   
                                                          
9 In Berlin and Mester (1999) the bank maximises the joint profit then the optimal contract maximises the profit of the 
firm and the bank, and should ensure that (4) holds when s=b, but when s=g  then 
)1(
)1( *
*
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g


 . This is a 
‘relationship lending’ result that causes the relationship between cost of funds and loan rates to differ between good 
and bad periods.  
ss Lr 
*
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With the onset of the global financial crisis, these results have to be re-examined to 
account for the fragmentation of funding arrangements noted by Arnold and Ewijk (2014), De 
Sola Perea and Van Nieuwenhuyze, (2014), Darracq-Paries et al (2014) and Holton and 
Rodriguez (2015). Short-term money market rates on unsecured interbank lending and 
collateralised repurchase agreements have deviated substantially from policy rates as liquidity 
and counterparty risk has increased. Moreover, the sovereign bond yields are no longer good 
proxies for the cost of market finance for banks in the period after the financial crisis. The higher 
default risk associated with banks in 2007-2009, lower quality of assets and undercapitalization 
have caused bank bond yields to deviate from sovereign bond yields according to Arnold and van 
Ewijk (2014), De Sola Perea and Van Nieuwenhuyze, (2014) and Darracq-Paries et al (2014). As 
yields on senior unsecured bonds issued by banks rose, gross issuance fell to near zero in the 
vulnerable countries and was replaced by covered bond issuance in other euro area countries 
(see Van Rixtel and Gasperini, 2013). This intensified in the sovereign debt crisis and the lending 
costs of these banks rose, particularly in the vulnerable countries (see Zoli, 2013 Albertazzi et al. 
2012; and Von Borstel et al., 2015).  
All in all, this suggests it is no longer valid practice to take a policy rate, a short-term 
wholesale market rate or a sovereign bond yield as a proxy for bank funding costs. Instead we 
suggest the BM model might be generalized to allow for a much wider set of liabilities held by the 
bank including: deposits, unsecured market funds of various types and maturities that include 
interbank deposits and bonds, and secured market funds that include covered bonds. We 
therefore have a weighted average cost of liabilities (WACL) measure defined as: 
 
J
j jsjjjss
rwRwCL
1
),(          (4) 
where j indexes the type of liability, with a weight, wj, based on the proportional share in total 
liabilities and the rate of interest rjs. Thus we propose to use a WACL concept that would allow 
for multiple sources of funds, and ensure that lending rates respond to the weighted average of 
these costs of liabilities not just to market or deposit rates, or any other arbitrarily selected rate. 
 
3. Bank Funding Costs 
An important contribution of this paper is the construction of a weighted average cost of 
liabilities (WACL) as an alternative benchmark for bank funding costs in each country. There are 
parallels between our approach and De Bondt et al. (2005), who argue that banks apply a markup 
with respect to a “cost” that depends on short and long-term market interest rates. This section 
explains how we compiled our measure, while details on data sources are reported in an 
appendix. The main difference between our approach and De Bondt et al. (2005) is that we use 
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the information on the banks’ balance sheets to construct our liability measure, while they take 
a weighted average of short and long rates from the yield curve.  
The WACL is a volume-weighted average of the rates at which Monetary and Financial 
Institutions (MFIs) can obtain finance:  
J
j ijtijtit
rwWACL
1
, where rijt are new business rates on 
the different component liabilities that the banks use to provide funds, and wijt are the weights 
on those rates based on the component share in total liabilities for the banks in each country. 
Taking i to be the country index, j the index of the types of liabilities held by banks, and t the time 
period, we sum over liabilities to provide an index of the weighted average cost of liabilities for 
each country i at each point in time t. We calculate two sets of WACL based on different maturities: 
one for the short-term and one for the long-term. We calibrate the short-term measure with a 
maturity of less than 1-year, whereas the long-term measure reflects maturities of more than 1-
year, with an average of 5-years. 
Our sample covers a total of 11 countries, nine euro area countries and in addition 
Denmark and United Kingdom.10 The data starts in 2003 and goes up to the end of 2017. For the 
euro area countries, data is obtained from the ECB’s Monetary and Financial Institutions Interest 
Rates (MIR). We used the data from the national central banks in order to complete the database 
for Denmark and the United Kingdom.  
 
3.1 Components and weights 
We use two weighting schemes using weights based on a) outstanding stock of liabilities from 
banks’ balance sheets, and b) flows rather than outstanding volumes. Both schemes are used to 
form weighted averages of interest rates on new transactions in the WACL measure, labelled 
WACL(stock) and WACL(flow) respectively. The first has the advantage that it draws information 
on a wider range of components from the bank balance sheets compared to the second, while the 
second has the advantage that new business rates are combined with changes to volumes to give 
a truly marginal cost of funds. Ultimately, we rely on the first weighting scheme based on 
outstanding stock of liabilities and use the second to provide a comparison from the flows. The 
results show that there similar outcomes in both cases regardless of the weight measure.  
 It is important to note that the relative proportions of the liabilities used to construct the 
weights vary from month to month, although the actual adjustment is not particularly fast in 
comparison to the adjustment of interest rates (discussed below). At the monthly frequency of 
                                                          
10 The rationale for including non-euro area countries is to test whether the issue is shared by more countries, or is just a 
feature of the monetary union. 
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our analysis, therefore, weights vary slowly over time. In addition some changes to the weights 
occur for reasons beyond the control of the banks, such as the emergence of new funding sources 
i.e. liquidity operations of central banks. This allows us to treat the liability weights as effectively 
exogenous in our dynamic panel estimates.  
The WACL is constructed using five types of liabilities. 11  Deposit liabilities (in all 
currencies, and excluding the general government) vis-à-vis the euro area12 to MFIs (interbank 
deposits) and to non-MFIs (deposits of the private non-financial sector) are the largest source of 
funds. Banks have a substantial deposit base in most countries, so that the first two components 
account for a large share of funding for lending: over 90 percent of total funding in the short-term 
and 70 percent of total long-term funding. Deposits from non-MFI sources are the largest 
component of the funding measure.  
Debt securities issued in all currencies in the euro area by the MFIs are reported at 
maturities up to and over one year. Bond markets are segmented to a large extent on national 
lines (van Rixtel and Gasperini, 2013) and tend to be influenced in different ways at times of crisis, 
yields showing substantial spikes. According to Table A1-A4, conventional bonds comprise a 
small share of short-term funding, while they account for approximately 15-30 percent of funding 
in the long term. We conclude that these securities are used much more extensively for long-term 
funding.  
Covered bonds data are obtained from Dealogic, and since the majority have a maturity of 
more than one year, they are used only in long-term funding calculations. The outstanding 
volumes  are not typically large, except for Germany and Spain, but they have grown since the 
crisis.  
Lastly, funding from central bank operations such as the Main Refinancing Operations 
(MROs) and the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) exists only for the euro area 
countries. Cheap funding given by the ECB in crisis time slightly lowered the funding cost of the 
MFIs. Van Rixtel and Gasperini (2013) show that Spain and Italy relied most heavily on liquidity 
                                                          
11 These are discussed in greater detail in the data appendix.  We exclude funding from equity issuance from the 
WACL since it accounts for a small percentage of the outstanding balances, and it is arguably not used by banks as a 
source of regular finance for bank lending, but rather as a structural adjustment (e.g. adjustment of capital ratios in 
response to regulatory requirements). Besides, Adrian et al. (2013) show that while changes in banks’ assets 
(including loans) and changes in their debt move proportionally, equity remains ‘sticky’, i.e. it does not adjust when 
there is a change in assets. 
12 For Denmark and the United Kingdom, we take the country itself as reference area, as opposed to the euro area as a 
whole. 
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operations provided by the ECB having borrowed, respectively, €400bn and €277bn in 
September 2012.  
The alternative WACL(flow) measure is constructed using new deposit data and gross 
issuance of conventional and covered bonds.  We use this to check that our results are not 
distorted by the use of outstanding amounts to construct the weights.  
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide a summary of the weights averaged over time 
based on outstanding amounts. 
 
3.2 Interest rates 
Each type of liability has a matching interest rate, which is always based on new transactions.13  
For the MFIs deposits to other MFIs we use the interbank money market rates. For the short-
term we use the overnight rates, while for the long-term the 1-year rates. The deposit rate of the 
non-MFI deposits for the euro area countries is obtained from the ECB MFI interest rate statistics, 
and is the rate on euro deposits with agreed maturity for the non-financial corporations and 
households with maturities up to 1 year for the short-term and over 1-year for the long-term. For 
Denmark and United Kingdom, similar rates have been obtained from the national central banks. 
Since Denmark reports no breakdown of interest rate by maturity, we use the same rates for both 
short-term and long-term deposits.  
As for the cost of debt securities, we measure the yield on bonds issued by banks as the 
interest rate swap rate plus a mark-up based on the credit default swap (CDS) rate for the banking 
sector in each country, using a simple average of available CDS rates for financial institutions in 
each country. In order to measure the long-term rate we use the 5-year interest rate swap and 
the 5-year financial CDS while for the short-term the 1-year interest rate swap plus the 1-year 
financial CDS. The interest rate on covered bonds is obtained from Barclays, which reports the 
yield to maturity for the outstanding amount of bonds (see the appendix where we plot the data). 
The rate on central bank operations is the Main Refinancing Rate of the euro area (liquidity 
operations were only available for banks in the euro area).  
The short-term and long-term interest rates are reported in Tables A3 and A4 in the 
Appendix. These figures indicate one source of the differences between the funding costs for 
different countries in our sample. When multiplied by the relevant weights they provide the 
short- or long-term WACL funding costs used in our analysis. 
 
                                                          
13 This implies both the baseline and the fully marginal WACL rely on the same interest rates. 
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3.3 A Comparison between WACL and the policy rate 
WACL funding costs are plotted in Graph 2, together with policy rates. Short-term funding costs 
followed policy rates very closely in all the countries in our sample, except during the 2003-2004 
downturn, while long-term funding costs were higher than policy rates, reflecting a term 
premium and compensation for risk. After the Lehman bankruptcy, credit risk was re-assessed, 
and the risk premium jumped upwards. While risk free rates fell as policy rates were reduced, 
market funding added a larger margin for credit risk than in the pre-crisis period (see Gilchrist 
and Mojon, 2013, Darracq-Paries et al. 2014). In most countries, this created wider margins 
between short-term and long-term funding costs, creating a divergence with policy rates in the 
post-crisis period.  This is most evident in the vulnerable countries, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
but also in the UK, which was more heavily exposed to the effects of the crisis at an early stage, 
as well as for Austria, whose banks were heavily exposed to Central and Eastern European 
countries. It is apparent from Graph 2 that there are sharp spikes from 2010Q1 reflecting the 
higher yields on conventional and, to a lesser extent, covered bonds following the sovereign debt 
crisis. To some extent, recourse to ECB liquidity cut the cost of funding but the influence was 
rather small. 
 
3.4 The comparison between WACL and lending rates 
We now turn to the main subject of our paper: a comparison of the WACL and lending rates 
offered by MFIs to households and the non-financial corporations. For households we collect 
from the ECB lending rates on new loans for house purchases (excluding revolving loans), 
overdrafts and credit card debt for maturities of up to 1-year and over 1-year. For non-financial 
corporates we collect the lending rates on new loans (other than revolving loans) and overdrafts 
and credit card debt, for the same breakdown of maturities as above. For Denmark, data are 
obtained from the national central bank.  
We examine separately short- and long-term lending. Graph 3 shows the rates on 
mortgage lending to households and loans to non-financial corporations for terms of less than 
one year versus the WACL. The movements in lending rates and funding costs are fairly similar 
within each country: there is a co-movement between these variables and policy rates. However, 
in the post-crisis period funding costs diverge from policy rates, and lending rates to households 
and firms tend to follow more closely the movement of funding costs.  
For the long term lending rates (over one year) we see a different pattern that is most 
evident in the vulnerable countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and to some extent 
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Austria. This can be seen in Graph 4 where the funding costs peaked from 2010-12 and slowly 
decreased after this period.  
 
4. Analysis of the Properties of Interest Rates 
4.1 An overview of our approach.  
There is a long history in econometrics of exploring equilibrium relationships using cointegration 
analysis (Granger, 1981; Granger 1983; Granger and Weiss, 1983; Engle and Granger, 1987) and 
error correction models (Phillips, 1957; Sargan, 1964; Davidson et al 1978). This is necessary 
because series are likely to be integrated, which is likely to show extremely high (spurious) 
correlation (Granger and Newbold, 1974), simply because a plain correlation analysis would pick 
up the trending behaviour of both variables. In our context, cointegration pins down the long-run 
relationships between the lending rates and the WACLs, while recognizing the integrated nature 
of the data as shown in Table 1.  
Our particular methodology, pooled mean group estimation (PMG) can then help 
determining the pass through coefficient from WACL to lending rates in the data. If we look at 
short time horizons of one or two months, we may find the variables do not co-move (short-term 
deviation), but over the longer time horizon, they do co-move. This is especially appealing in our 
setting, as we cover euro area countries sharing a common monetary policy. More specifically, it 
seems reasonable to assume that changes in the level of interest rates would eventually transmit 
to lending rates in all countries, which is enforced by a common long-run relationship. At the 
same time, however, country-specific structural features, e.g. competition in the banking market, 
easier access to capital and securities markets14 are likely to make the transmission uneven in 
the short run, which is reflected by the use of PMG is a suitable specification since our study 
covers many countries which over the long run may move in similar ways to each other, but it 
allows for differential short-run relationships across countries, and also differential speed of 
convergence to the common long-run equilibrium. These differences across countries could 
reflect some differences in labour or product markets, economic structure, banking system etc. 
They are reported in Tables 3, 4 and 6. 15  
                                                          
14 For example, Fungáčová et al (2014) find that in the euro area the transmission of monetary policy via the bank 
lending channel is weaker in countries with concentrated market power;  while Gambacorta and Mizen (2019).note that 
greater availability of bank capital and access to securitization dampens the effect of monetary policy shocks.. 
15 We note that it is perfectly possible to use short-term interest rates in long-run equilibrium 
analysis via cointegration. The short-run on the interest rate refers to the maturity of the 
instrument (policy rate or security) not the horizon of the relationship.  Therefore, a long run 
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We note that it is perfectly possible to use short-term interest rates in long-run 
equilibrium analysis via cointegration. The short-run on the interest rate refers to the maturity 
of the instrument (policy rate or security) not the horizon of the relationship.  Therefore, a long 
run relationship (by which we mean a stable cointegrating relationship) could exist between a 
short-term funding cost and a short-term lending rate.  
We would not expect pass-through to be perfect in the short-run, but if the long-run pass-
through is low, it is a sign that there are serious structural differences between financial markets 
in these countries. The use of a dynamic model such as PMG helps to distinguish dynamic 
adjustments (that drive the short-run behaviour of lending rates) from the long-run 
relationships. It is also conceivable that over periods when there have been significant shocks to 
financial relationships and the policy response that structural breaks may occur in the data, and 
we allow for these in our models.  
 
4.2 Preliminary analysis of the data 
We first test the properties of the interest rates beginning with non-stationarity. We use the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) test, with a null hypothesis that no variable in the panel has a unit root. 
The test statistic is based on the standardised t-bar test statistic based on the (augmented) 
Dickey–Fuller statistics averaged across the groups, which converges to a standard Normal. 
Results reported in Table 1 show we comfortably fail to reject the null in all cases, which confirms 
that the interest rates are all non-stationary. This means that any levels relationships between 
them should satisfy the requirement of being co-integrated.16  
                                                          
relationship (by which we mean a stable cointegrating relationship) could exist between a short-
term funding cost and a short-term lending rate.  
 
16 This can be surprising to economists used to nominal variables such as interest rates and inflation being stationary. 
However, the literature starting with Klemperer (1987), Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1994) and 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) suggests that adjustment costs and imperfect competition give banks incentives to adjust 
their lending or deposit rates sluggishly. Berlin and Mester (1999) appeal to relationship banking to explain persistence 
in rates over the economic cycle, while Hofmann and Mizen (2004) and Banerjee et al. (2013) imply banks may set rates 
based on current and forecasts of future money market rates. De Bondt et al (2005) note that banks set loan rates on 
longer maturity products to minimize interest rate risk and therefore respond sluggishly to changes in short term market 
rates. For policy rates the persistence is often explained by the policymaking process involving committees that must 
build consensus around a case for change, and the desire to build credibility by avoiding reversals of rates. In the 
presence of parameter and model uncertainty (Brainard, 1967), policymakers appear to smooth rates (Goodfriend, 
1991; Sack, 2000; Orphanides, 2003). 
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Many authors have noted that due to trade and financial market integration there are 
close international interdependences between countries, particularly in a competitive market or 
a common currency area (Kose et al., 2003, Canova et al., 2007, Pesaran et al., 2007, Canova and 
Ciccarelli, 2009, 2013). Therefore, we use second-generation CIPS test of panel unit root test due 
to Pesaran (2007) that allow for cross sectional dependence modelled using cross-sectional 
means of the levels and differences of the variables. The results reported in Table 1 comfortably 
fail to reject the null in all cases except two at the 10% level, based on the same standardised 
average t-statistic against critical values given in Pesaran (2007).  
 
4.3 Long-run relationships  
To explore the long run with non-stationary variables in our panel we use the Persyn and 
Westerlund (2008) panel cointegration test, which makes allowance for cross-sectional 
dependence.  Failure to find cointegration would suggest that there is no long-run relationship 
between the variables of interest. Defining the relationship between yit, (the lending rate which 
is the focus of our analysis), and xit, the driver of the lending rate (i.e. the policy rate or the WACL) 
using the following equation:  
it
Q
q qtiiq
P
p ptiiptiitiiit
exyxyy      0 ,1 ,1,1, )(       (6) 
We compute two test statistics, G and P, for each lending rate. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are formulated as  
H0:i  = 0 versus HP1:i = < 0 for all i, which can be interpreted as a null of no cointegration and 
a rejection of the null as evidence of cointegration for the panel as a whole.  
H0:i = 0 versus HG1:i < 0 for at least some i, which can be interpreted as a null of no cointegration 
and a rejection of the null as evidence of cointegration for at least one of the cross-sectional units.  
We first apply these tests to the relationship between four separate lending rates and policy rates 
and the results are mixed for the full sample. The test statistics are reported in Table 2 and the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected only in a few cases. The G  test indicates one out 
of four rejections, and the P test two out of four rejections using data over the full sample. This 
implies the relationship is less stable than for the period prior to the global financial crisis, where 
we find that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected all cases but one.  We can interpret 
this as evidence of a change in the relationship at around the time of the financial crisis.  
Table 2 also reports cointegration tests for WACL(stock), WACL(flow) and the four 
different lending rates. Results for the WACL(stock) measure rejects the null of no cointegrating 
relationship under G  and P  tests with no exceptions. For WACL(flow) we find the same result, 
except for short-term lending to businesses, where we cannot reject the null of no cointegration. 
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We conclude that there is much more evidence of a stable panel cointegrating relationship 
between lending rates and funding costs based on the WACL(stock ) and WACL (flow) measures 
than for lending rates and policy rates. This implies a stronger and more reliable relationship 
between lending rates and WACL compared to the results for policy rates.  
 
4.4  Structural Breaks  
Before we consider the magnitude of pass-through for bank funding costs, we repeat the 
cointegration tests by allowing for structural breaks in our data after the financial crisis. Graph 1 
indicates that there was a well-defined level shift in the policy rate in the euro area, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom. Failure to allow for structural breaks can have harmful effects on the size 
and power of cointegration tests according to evidence in Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2013). Therefore, we utilize their procedure to search for a cointegrating relationship allowing 
for a structural break and cross-sectional dependence in the panel.   
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013) allow for several potential breaks in intercept, 
trend and the cointegrating relationship, which can be transferred to our model defined by 
equation (6), plus some assumptions about the driving processes for eit and xit. The methodology 
allows for multiple breaks, and the number and position of the breaks need not coincide for each 
country in the panel. We can consider a break process defined by  
  
ii m
j ijtij
m
j ijtijiiit
DTDUtD
11
            (7) 
where the i=1,…, N and t=1, …, T.  The effect of the break is modelled using DUijt = 1 and DTijt = (t-
Tbij) for t > Tbij  and 0 otherwise, where Tbij = bijT  for bij ∊ (0,1)  reflects the location of the break 
in trend, and it = ij for Tcij-1 < t <= Tcij ,  where cij ∊ (0,1)  is the location of the break in the 
cointegrating relationship.  Therefore the model can investigate the possibility of a break in the 
intercept (DUijt), a change in trend (DTijt), or a break in the cointegrating vector (it), which is a 
function of time in their model.  
We report the results in Table 2 for a model allowing for a break in the intercept (Za) and 
a model allowing a break in the intercept and the cointegrating vector (Zac), for our four lending 
rates versus policy rates and then versus our WACL measure.  The test statistics reject the null of 
no cointegration at conventional levels of significance against the alternative of cointegration for 
all four lending rates with our WACL measure, indicating evidence that the cointegrating 
relationships is robust to the inclusion of a structural break in the intercept, but less so for the 
cointegrating vector, for which only one rejection is found. The results for policy rates are much 
weaker and point to rejection of the null only in one case. These tests lead us to conclude that our 
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results are not completely overthrown when we allow for cross sectional dependence and a 
structural break in the equation.   
 
5. Modelling Rates in a Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel  
We wish to explore the relationship between the lending rates and the funding costs in a dynamic 
heterogeneous panel pooled mean group (PMG) estimator first proposed by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) in order to obtain an estimate of the degree of pass-
through. This introduces a (common) long-run relationship corresponding to the cointegrating 
relationship we obtained in the previous section. Once again we take yit, as the lending rate and 
xit, as the driver of the lending rate (i.e. the policy rate or the WACL) in an ARDL model with lags 
P, Q (determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion, BIC), as follows: 
iti
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This can be rewritten as a stacked set of N individual equations relating yit  and xit  for groups i = 
1,2,…N  over the time period t = 1,2,…T as 
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where Yi = (yi1, … yiT)’, Xi = (xi1, … xiT)’, 1 = (1,…, 1)’, i = (ei1, … eiT)’ are all T x 1 vectors of 
observations, ones and residual errors, and  is the first difference operator.  
The model can be re-specified as: 
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where the relationship )( 1, iiii XY    for the levels provides information on the long-run 
cointegrating relation between lending rates and driving variables that we discovered in the 
previous section. Long-run homogeneity is imposed by setting i=17  Estimates of i = ii allow 
us to derive the long-run pass-through coefficients by dividing through by i, the adjustment 
speed of rates to deviations from this long-run relationship for each country i.   
 To mitigate the effects of cross-sectional dependence we introduce cross-sectional 
averages of the differences and lagged differences in each variable following Pesaran (2006), 
Chudik and Pesaran (2015) and Eberhardt and Presbitero (2016) as follows: 
                                                          
17 The PMG model imposes long-run homogeneity while a mean group estimator (MGE), which is a plain average of 
individual group i estimates of equations stacked in (12), does not. The MGE estimator is consistent but inefficient if 
there is a common slope coefficient. 
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Terms that are over-scored are the cross-sectional averages of each variable:  
 
N
i ii
YNY
1
1
and  
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N
i ii
XNX
1
1 . Lag lengths R, S = int(T1/3). Equation (11) therefore represents a 
dynamic PMG estimator, similar to that used by Binder and Offerman (2012), whereby cross-
section averages are added to the PMG. The model can be estimated by OLS, since the terms in 
first differences of cross-sectional averages and first differences allow for non-stationarity, cross-
sectional correlation, heterogeneity and non-linearity or asymmetry in the data (see Eberhardt 
and Presbitero, 2016). 
5.1 Estimates of Pass-through from Funding Costs and Policy Rates 
In the context of the PMG model (11) it is possible to estimate a model allowing for a common 
long-run pass-through relationship with heterogeneous responses in the short run to reflect 
institutional differences across countries. We report our baseline results in Table 3 for 
WACL(stocks) and WACL(flows).  We split the sample of countries into three groups: the first 
group includes all 11 countries in the euro area as well as the UK and Denmark, the second refers 
only to the euro area and the third includes only core euro area countries (i.e. excluding Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain). The tables report common long-run coefficient estimates of the 
relationship between the four different interest rates (short-term and long-term loans to 
business and short-term and long-term mortgages, in successive columns) versus funding costs, 
over the full sample period January 2003 – December 2017. We also report the estimate of the 
average adjustment to the long-run relationship for each group of countries.  
Results for WACL(stocks) are displayed in the first panel.  We find that the common pass-
through coefficient estimates take plausible positive values, which are significantly less than one 
for the full sample. This implies that a 100bp increase the WACL(stocks, adjusted) funding cost 
for banks would result in an increase in lending rates between 87-98bp. Long-term and short-
term lending rates show degrees of interest rate pass-through consistent with the findings in the 
previous literature (see De Bondt et al., 2005, Hristov et al., 2014). Restricting the sample of 
countries to the euro area countries or the euro area core does not substantially change the 
estimates.  A similar pattern is observed in the second panel where we report the results for 
WACL(flows, unadjusted) since estimated pass-through coefficients are between 85-96bp. The 
comparability of the estimated pass-through coefficients makes an important point that our 
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results are robust to the choice of funding weights, since the similarity of the results using either 
stocks- or flows-based weights in the construction of the funding costs does not materially alter 
the majority of pass-through estimates.18 
In Table 3, we also report the average of short-run adjustment coefficients for each group 
of countries in two rows. To ensure that our results that average across countries are not unduly 
influenced by outlying observations, we can estimate the MGE model robustly.19 The first row 
shows the estimates with equal weights on the observations of each country, while the second 
adjusts the weight according to the proximity of the country observation to the average value for 
all countries, which we refer to as the robust estimate.  The adjustment coefficients are negative 
and significant in every case for each of the panels. The adjustment speed is generally faster for 
short- and long-term lending rates to business than to households: the estimated coefficients are 
two or three times larger for lending rates to business using WACL(stocks) or WACL(flows) 
compared to the adjustment coefficients for households. The difference in the adjustment speed 
is illustrated by the half-life calculations reported for each of the lending rates, which show decay 
is faster for lending rates to business (around 6 months) compared with lending rates for 
households (around 10 months). This may be a consequence of the bespoke nature of loans to 
business, which are likely to adjust to prevailing conditions more quickly than loans to 
households, which are generic products. The t-bar test for the PMG model shows that the 
adjustment coefficient is significantly different from zero when averaged across countries. 
These findings contrast markedly with results for policy rates reported in Table 4, where 
pass-through estimates tend show more variation over the full sample according to the type of 
lending rate under consideration, compared to WACL results in Table 3. Short-term rates to NFCs 
appear to have similar degree of pass-through as do short rates to households for the euro area 
and euro core countries, but short rates for mortgages over the full sample of countries has a 
much lower pass-through coefficient and long-term rates are noticeably lower across the board. 
However, results for a shorter sample up to the beginning of the global financial crisis, indicate 
pass-through estimates that are closer to the estimates provided by the WACL in Table 3. It is 
                                                          
18 One reason for this result may be that funding weights adjust relatively slowly compared to funding rates, therefore 
variation in WACL(stocks) versus WACL (flows) may be mostly determined by changes in rates not weights.  
19 We compute the common relationship in lag levels using PMG and then estimate the MGE estimate using the 
calculated error correction term and robustness. Robustness ensures that the weight on each country is based on 
the proximity of the country observation to the average of all countries, reducing the influence of outlier 
observations compared to the non-robust estimates which use a 1/N weighting scheme for observations from each 
country. We report results from PGE and MGE(robust) methods.  We follow standard practice in the literature by 
using robust regression (see Hamilton, 1992) to reduce the weight on outliers in the computation of the averages. 
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only when using the full sample that we also find adjustment speeds are different when estimated 
using policy rates or WACL, and the half-life for most of the lending rates is longer than the half-
life reported in Table 3 for samples including all eleven countries or the euro area, implying a 
discernible change in response to policy rates after the crisis.  
 
5.2 Relationships with Components of the WACL 
In the previous section we have shown that there is a strong and stable relationship between the 
various lending rates and the weighted average cost of liabilities. By examining the relationship 
between the components of the WACL and lending rates using the same techniques documented 
above we can examine whether components have the same relative importance and if we find 
they do not, we can take a stance on which type of funding cost is most important. 
The results of our analysis are reported in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 shows the evidence for a 
cointegrating relationship between short-term and long-term lending rates of different types and 
each of the components: MFI deposits, non-MFI deposits and short-term securities.  Short-term 
lending rates to non-financial companies are most closely related to short-term securities 
(according to Persyn-Westerlund and Banerjee-Carrion-i-Sylvestre tests), and also related to 
deposits of MFIs or non-MFIs (according to the Banerjee-Carrion-i-Sylvestre tests alone). Short-
term mortgages are more closely linked to deposits (according to Persyn-Westerlund and 
Banerjee-Carrion-i-Sylvestre tests), and related to securities (according to the Banerjee-Carrion-
i-Sylvestre test). Long-term lending to companies is cointegrated with all types of funding but 
there is more consistent support for a relationship with long-term securities of different types. 
Long-term lending rates on mortgages are statistically connected to many different types of 
funding but most closely to deposits.  
We noted previously that these funding costs were elevated compared to policy rates, and the 
effects are transmitted to lending rates.  It is possible to interpret the cointegrating relationships 
between separate components as evidence that explains the reason for the higher funding costs. 
For example, the consistent evidence that short-term securities yields are cointegrated with 
lending rates offered to NFCs implies higher securities yields (possibly due to higher yields on 
sovereign bonds of similar maturity) were an important driver of the WACL in this case. Short-
term mortgages seem to be more consistently cointegrated with MFI and non-MFI deposits 
therefore we may conclude the elevated WACL measure in this case reflects the higher cost of 
unsecured interbank deposits (counterparty risk) and the higher competition for deposits from 
non-financial that raised their cost. Longer-term lending to non-financial companies and 
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mortgages are influenced by all types of funding but with more influence from securities for 
lending rates to non-financial companies and deposits for mortgages. This indicates the that 
rising weighted average costs are more broadly based on all types of funding but are primarily 
driven by similar risk factors and competitive pressures that influenced short rates.  
Examining the components of the WACL adds further insights and makes clearer how monetary 
policy is transmitted through the WACL to lending rates. There is a rationale for conventional 
monetary policies to target short rates and unconventional policies to target long term rates.  In 
terms of financial stability, the maturity alignment eases concerns about maturity mismatches 
on bank balance sheets. Taken at face value, therefore, our results would suggest that in order to 
stimulate long-term lending, the central bank should aim at keeping a lidto influence on the 
components of the long-term WACL, which is best achieved using unconventional policy 
measures. While this is somewhat at odds with the common view that commercial banks engage 
in, and profit mostly from, activities related to maturity transformation, we also have to remark 
that such activities may be too risky in a highly uncertain environment and with unconventional 
policy measures flattening the yield curve. 
In Table 6 we explore the estimates of the adjustment coefficient (adjusted and unadjusted). The 
coefficients are negative and significant in every case for each of the panels, but the magnitudes 
of the coefficients differ by quite a large margin.  The adjustment speed is generally slower for 
those components that showed the strongest evidence of cointegration in Table 5 and the 
corresponding half-life calculations show decay is slower for these components. 
5.3 Other Robustness Checks 
The previous tables have presented the long-run relationships and the average adjustment 
coefficients across countries when we estimate the pass-through relationship over the full 
Jan2003-Dec2017 sample. We now consider sub-samples of the data to explore the pass-through 
of WACL to lending rates up to three successive break points in the data. The first break point is 
the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC), July 2007, after which bank funding costs increased 
significantly. The second is the point just before Lehman collapsed and the recession took hold, 
August 2008, where the data show that there was a deterioration in economic growth rates 
leading to a recession.20 The third break point is just prior to the sovereign debt crisis, December 
2009: banks in vulnerable countries were shut out of the bond market (or faced exceptionally 
                                                          
20 The growing intensity of the recession is also reflected in the fact that, banks began to tighten credit conditions in 
2008Q3 according to the ECB Bank Lending Survey, and house prices began to fall. 
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very high costs), and perceptions of default risk for banks increased (as shown by the increased 
correlation of bank CDS spreads with sovereign CDS spreads).  
Table 7 reports the pass-through coefficients for WACL(stocks) data for these three break 
points for the euro area countries. The interesting result is that coefficient estimates are larger 
in magnitude compared with those reported in Table 4 (a result also observed by Von Borstel et 
al. 2015 in the context of their FAVAR model). When we end the sample in July 2007, the pass-
through is close to one for all four lending rates. Pass-through was essentially complete before 
the crisis, and higher than the estimate for the full sample reported in Table 4. Adjustment speeds 
were also about 50% higher, and for lending to business the adjustment coefficients were 100% 
larger, than those reported in Table 3. This resulted in lower half-life values for all lending rates 
over the pre-crisis sample. When we break the data in August 2008 the estimated coefficients are 
smaller in three cases out of four compared to the sample up to July 2007, but larger than the full 
sample estimates from Table 3. Adjustment speeds fall a little or stay the same compared to 
estimates to July 2007, and half-life values rise in two cases. If we break the data in January 2010 
at the start of the sovereign debt crisis, we find the estimated pass-through drops a little further, 
especially for long rates, and adjustment speeds are about the same. This evidence seems to 
suggest that pass-through was higher in the pre-crisis period, and has fallen to some degree 
through the post-crisis period culminating in slightly lower but substantial values for pass-
through for the full sample reported in Table 4.  
The conclusion we draw from these tables is that the coefficient estimates from a carefully 
constructed weighted average cost of liabilities over a range of sample endpoints still gives 
results that imply substantial pass-through of funding costs to lending rates. It is hard to argue 
from these results that banks response to funding costs has fundamentally changed in the post 
crisis period, although there is some evidence that adjustment speeds associated with pass-
through have declined more substantially.  
6. The dynamic transmission of monetary policy and bank funding shocks 
Under the traditional analytical framework according to which lending rates were tied to policy 
rates, central banks could easily steer the former by moving the latter. Our evidence of a 
breakdown in the above-mentioned relationship, however, calls into question the ability itself of 
central banks to control lending rates, at least through conventional monetary policy. But since 
the onset of the Great Financial Crisis, major central banks have deployed a large spectrum of 
unconventional policies with the objective to stimulate lending.  In this section, we briefly explore 
the extent to which such unconventional monetary policy actions have dynamically influenced 
bank funding costs and hence lending rates. We will do so in two steps. 
23 
 
First, we assess the extent to which exogenous unconventional monetary policy shocks 
have been able to influence bank funding costs over time. To do so, we find convenient to bypass 
the problem of finding an appropriate identification scheme, and resort to off-the-shelf shocks. 
We based our analysis on the “target” and “path” shocks identified by Ferrari et al (2017) in a 
high-frequency event study of the ECB actions. In very simplified terms, the first shock 
corresponds to moves in the intercept of the yield curve, while the second one relates to its slope. 
One can then interpret the first as a change in the desired level of interest rates (which makes it 
akin to a change in policy rates in the pre-ZLB times), and the second as a change in the path of 
adjustment to that level, which also includes the term premium (i.e. something closer to forward 
guidance). We then aggregate such shocks at our monthly frequency and conduct a local 
projection exercise (Jorda 2005) in which bank funding costs are regressed on different lags of 
the shocks, as well as other control variables (GDP growth, inflation, policy rates).  
Responses for the short- and long-term WACL are displayed in Graph 5. As discussed 
above, the “target” shock resembles more closely a conventional shock to policy rates, and 
therefore it is not surprising to observe that it seems to transmit significantly to the WACL 
(especially the short-term one). The results for the “path” shocks are instead more mixed: short-
term WACL responds only with a substantial lag, arguably when the rates start following the 
indicated “path”, while the long-term WACL does not respond significantly. What we learn from 
these results is that overall ECB unconventional policies successfully managed to steer bank 
funding costs – especially the short-term ones. Our results also seem to suggest that the 
commitment to maintain accommodative conditions transmitted more strongly compared to the 
attempts to keep long-term rates low.  
As a second step, we check how bank funding costs transmit to lending rates once such 
unconventional monetary policy shocks are accounted for. To do so, we resort to a panel VAR 
(see Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013 for an overview of panel VAR methods and applications). More 
specifically, we employ the methodology proposed by Love and Zicchino (2006) and further 
developed in Abrigo and Love (2015), which is based on pooled estimation.  To identify the shock 
to funding cost correctly, i.e. a change, which is orthogonal to other endogenous factors that may 
drive its dynamics, we resort to Choleski decompositions, which are a well-established tool in the 
VAR literature.21 Our starting point are the monetary VARs popularised by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992), where an exogenous shock to monetary policy is identified by controlling for movements 
in GDP and inflation, which could affect the endogenous response of policy rates. This is 
                                                          
21 Love and Zicchino (2006) also rely on a Choleski decomposition to identify the shocks. 
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sometimes referred to as a slow-to-fast identification strategy. We adopt a similar reasoning for 
bank funding costs, and add lending rates to the VAR, to investigate their dynamic reaction. 
Therefore, our VAR includes (in this order) real GDP growth, CPI inflation, bank funding costs 
and the lending rates, with all variables in levels.  
Based on the ordering laid out above, the underlying identifying assumption for the shock to 
bank funding costs is that they are allowed to react contemporaneously to all the other variables 
in the system except the lending rate, which is instead unrestricted. Moreover, the resulting shock 
to bank funding costs is net of changes due to the business cycle, as controlled for by GDP and 
inflation. Moreover, to account for the extent of (conventional and unconventional) monetary 
stimulus deployed by the ECB during the period under review, we also include as exogenous 
variables a series of monetary policy shocks, as identified by Ferrari et al (2017). By doing so, we 
also net the bank funding costs shock from such (exogenous) monetary shocks. 
The results are reported in Graph 6. The (cumulated) impulse response is given by a thin 
solid line in each graph, with standard errors represented by the shading. In all four panels, we 
see the expected positive response in lending rates to a positive shock to funding costs that dies 
away gradually over time. These results are consistent with the cointegration analysis and 
further strengthen our baseline results: the transmission of bank funding shocks to short-term 
lending rates is stronger; the transmission to rates to non-financial corporations also appears a 
bit stronger compared to that on mortgages and, importantly, the dynamic relationship survives 
controlling for exogenous monetary policy shocks. 
At first sight, the use of an unrestricted VAR specification may seem at odds with the 
cointegrating framework adopted in the previous sections. However, we remark that 
unrestricted VARs allow cointegrating relationship to emerge from the data, in case they are 
strongly supported by the correlation pattern. In this case, the endpoint of the cumulated IRFs is 
similar to the estimated long-term pass-through of a one standard deviation shock to bank 
funding costs to the corresponding lending rate, although we are more interested in the dynamic 
path after a  one standard deviation shock to bank funding costs than the implied long-run pass 
through. 
 
7. Conclusions  
Many observers have noted since the global financial crisis that lending rates set by banks have 
not fallen as much as policy rates (see ECB, 2012; Beirne, 2012; ECB, 2013; Hristov et al., 2014; 
Von Borstel et al, 2015) and funding costs have become more dispersed across Europe (see 
Albertazzi et al 2012; Arnold and van Ewijk, 2014; Darracq-Paries et al. 2014; De Sola Perea and 
25 
 
Van Nieuwenhuyze, 2014; Holton and Rodriguez, 2015). This poses important questions for 
monetary policymakers who are seeking to determine whether banks are taking advantage of the 
low interest rate environment by failing to pass on lower rates to loans, or whether a break in 
the relationship between policy rates and lending rates has altered the way central banks should 
model the transmission mechanism. These are core issues in the debate about the effectiveness 
of monetary policy and the price of bank lending in Europe; as such, they have attracted plenty 
of attention from central banks (see ECB 2015, 2016).    
We investigate the relationship between lending rates, bank funding and policy rates over 
the period 2003 – 2017 for 11 European countries inside and outside the euro area using 
dynamic panel methods that allow for heterogeneity and cross country dependence developed 
by Pesaran (2006) and Chudik and Pesaran (2015). This extends previous panel VAR models of 
interest rate pass-through that have not considered these features. Our results show that there 
is stronger evidence for a stable relationship between lending rate and a weighted average cost 
of liabilities (WACL) measure than for policy rates. There are powerful arguments in support of 
a funding measure based on a broad range of banks’ liabilities that are strengthened further by 
these results. We conclude that funding costs broadly defined are most relevant to lending rates 
since there is no divergence in the post crisis period. Policy rates on the other hand, which were 
a reasonable proxy for funding costs before 2007 when liquidity and counterparty risks were low 
and stable, are no longer good proxies under conditions that have substantially changed. Our 
findings have refocused attention on the cost and composition of bank funding as a means to 
understand interest rate pass-through, which has been acknowledged by central banks (ECB, 
2015; ECB, 2016) and through real interest rates explain cyclical differences in monetary 
transmission through the investment channel (European Commission, 2016). 
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MFI lending rates for selected countries: short- and long-term 
In per cent Graph 1 
Germany  France  Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain  United Kingdom   
 
 
 
  
Germany  France  Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain  United Kingdom   
 
 
 
  
1  The short-term is represented as less than 1-year maturity.    2  The long-term is represented as above 1-year maturity. The average maturity 
assumed for the long-term is 5-year. 
Sources: European Central Bank; national data. 
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Bank funding costs (WACL) and policy rates1 
In per cent Graph 2 
Austria  Finland  France 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany  Ireland  Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands  Portugal  Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
Denmark  United Kingdom   
 
 
 
  
1  The short-term represents less than 1-year maturity, while the long-term more than 1-year maturity assuming an average of 5-year. 
Sources: European Central Bank; Barclays; Dealogic; national data. 
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MFI lending rates and funding costs: short-term1 
In per cent Graph 3 
Austria  Finland  France 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany  Ireland  Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands  Portugal  Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
Denmark  United Kingdom   
 
 
 
  
1  The short-term is represented as less than 1-year in maturity. 
Sources: European Central Bank; national data.  
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MFI lending rates and funding costs: long-term2 
In per cent Graph 4 
Austria  Finland  France 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany  Ireland  Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands  Portugal  Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
Denmark  United Kingdom   
 
 
 
  
1  The long-term is represented as above 1-year maturity. The average maturity assumed for the long-term is 5-year. 
Sources: European Central Bank; Barclays; Dealogic; national data. 
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Hyperlink BIS 
 
Bank funding costs respond strongly to “target” unconventional monetary policy 
shocks but more weakly to “path” shocks Graph 5 
“Target shock”1 to the short-term funding cost  “Path shock”2 to the short-term funding cost 
 
 
 
“Target shock”1 to the long-term funding cost  “Path shock”2 to the long-term funding cost 
 
 
 
1  Change in the fixed rate on Overnight-Index Swaps (OIS) with a one month tenor.    2  Change in the spread between the 2-year sovereign 
bond yield and 1-month OIS rate. 
Sources: BIS Working Papers No 626; authors’ calculations. 
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Hyperlink BIS 
 
Lending rates respond significantly to a shock in the corresponding bank funding 
cost Graph 6 
Short-term lending rate to non-financial corporations  Short-term lending rates for residential loans 
 
 
 
Long-term lending rate to non-financial corporations  Long-term lending rates for residential loans 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Unit root tests Table 1 
Im–Pesaran–Shin 
panel unit root test       
Lending Rates 
 
Short rate to 
NFCs 
Long rate to 
NFCs 
Short 
mortgage 
rate 
Long 
mortgage 
rate  
 
 
2.226 
(0.987) 
0.415 
(0.661) 
0.995 
(0.840) 
2.644 
(0.996)  
 
Bank funding costs  
(short term) 
WACL(stock, 
unadjusted) 
WACL (stock, 
adjusted) 
WACL (flow, 
adjusted) 
 
 
 
 
1.315 
(0.906) 
1.315 
(0.906) 
1.895 
(0.971) 
 
 
 
Bank funding costs  
(long term) 
WACL(stock, 
unadjusted) 
WACL (stock, 
adjusted) 
WACL (flow, 
adjusted) 
 
 
 
 
3.893 
(0.999) 
4.045 
(0.999) 
3.617  
(0.999) 
 
 
 
Policy rate Policy rate      
 
1.791 
(0.963) 
   
 
 
CIPS panel unit root 
test       
Lending Rates 
 
Short rate to 
NFCs 
Long rate to 
NFCs 
Short 
mortgage 
rate 
Long 
mortgage 
rate  
 
 -1.988 –2.835* –1.923 -2.470   
Bank funding costs  
(short term) 
WACL(stock, 
unadjusted) 
WACL (stock, 
adjusted) 
WACL (flow, 
adjusted) 
 
 
 
 -1.622 -1.622 -2.814*    
Bank funding costs  
(long term) 
WACL(stock, 
unadjusted) 
WACL (stock, 
adjusted) 
WACL (flow, 
adjusted) 
 
 
 
 -2.453 -2.282 -2.628*     
Policy rate Policy rate      
 -0.420      
Notes: The top panel reports the W–statistic for the Im, Peseran and Shin (1999) test with p-value in brackets. The bottom panel 
reports the Pesaran (2007) CIPS test with t–statistic 
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Cointegration tests     Table 2 
Cointegration test allowing for 
cross sectional dependence 
Persyn & Westerlund 
(2008) Test Short rate to 
NFCs 
Long rate to 
NFCs 
Short 
mortgage 
rate 
Long 
mortgage 
rate 
Policy Rate      
Policy rate (full sample) G -3.030*** -0.985 0.182 -1.072 
Policy rate (full sample) P -0.604 -2.212* 0.156 -2.815*** 
Policy rate (Pre-GFC sample) G -5.801*** -3.375*** -3.462*** -0.430 
Policy rate (Pre-GFC sample) P -4.612*** -5.241*** -3.810*** -4.283*** 
Weighted Average Cost of 
Liabilities (WACL) 
     
WACL (stock, unadjusted) G -3.023*** -2.331** -2.186** -3.081*** 
WACL (stock, unadjusted) P -1.338* -4.366*** -2.387*** -2.106** 
WACL (stock adjusted) G -3.023*** -2.925*** -2.186** -3.553*** 
WACL (stock, adjusted) P -1.338* -2.876*** -2.387*** -2.392*** 
WACL (flow, adjusted) G -0.431 -1.272 -2.164** -2.611*** 
WACL (flow, adjusted) P 0.842 -2.868*** -1.964** -2.558*** 
Cointegration test allowing for 
structural breaks and cross 
sectional dependence 
Banerjee & Carrion-i-
Sylvestre (2013) Test Short rate to 
NFCs 
Long rate to 
NFCs 
Short 
mortgage 
rate 
Long 
mortgage 
rate 
Policy Rate      
Policy rate (full sample, intercept 
break) 
 
Za -1.429 -1.311 -2.882*** -0.193 
Policy rate (full sample, intercept 
and cointegrating vector break) 
 
Zac -0.592 -0.468 0.448 1.834 
Weighted Average Cost of 
Liabilities (WACL) 
     
WACL (stock, adjusted, full sample, 
intercept break) 
 
Za -2.203** -2.355*** -1.824* -1.763* 
WACL (stock, adjusted full sample, 
intercept and cointegrating vector 
break) 
 
Zac -3.321*** 
 
 
-1.208 
 
-0.954 
 
-0.526 
 
Note: The critical value for Persyn and Westerlund (2008) Gand P tests at the 5% level is -1.96 and the critical value for Banerjee and 
Carrion-I-Silvestre (2013) Za and Zac tests is -1.96. 
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Pesaran-Shin-Smith pooled mean group estimates of interest rate pass-through using weighted average cost of liabilities 
(WACL) Table 3 
 WACL (stock, adjusted) WACL (flow) 
 Short rate to 
NFCs 
Long rate to 
NFCs 
Short mortgage 
rate  
Long mortgage 
rate  
Short rate to 
NFCs 
Long rate to 
NFCs 
Short mortgage 
rate  
Long mortgage 
rate  
Countries: Euro Area, UK and Denmark 
Cointegrating relation         
Pass-through estimate 0.875*** 0.844*** 0.987*** 0.916*** 0.856*** 0.954*** 0.959*** 0.966*** 
  0.010 0.026 0.021 0.029 0.033 0.034 0.024 0.040 
Short-run adjustment                 
coefficient -0.190*** -0.161*** -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.089*** -0.133*** -0.057*** -0.059*** 
 0.045 0.038 0.018 0.025 0.032 0.021 0.011 0.014 
Short-run adjustment                 
coefficient (robust) -0.184*** -0.127*** -0.060*** -0.047*** -0.064** -0.132*** -0.055*** -0.044*** 
 0.050 0.020 0.017 0.008 0.027 0.023 0.012 0.010 
No Obs. 1867 1891 1891 1891 1844 1844 1844 1844 
RMSE 0.1504 0.3544 0.1141 0.2065 0.1580 0.3529 0.1186 0.2078 
t-bar () -3.245*** -2.582*** -3.069*** -2.594** -2.091** -2.546** -2.799*** -2.517** 
Half-life (in months) 5.1 6.2 9.9 9.8 11.2 7.5 13.9 11.8 
Countries: Euro Area 
Cointegrating relation         
Pass-through estimate 0.861*** 0.947*** 1.000*** 0.966*** 0.856*** 0.997*** 0.964*** 0.978*** 
  0.011 0.031 0.022 0.046 0.018 0.037 0.024 0.049 
Short-run adjustment                 
coefficient -0.185*** -0.128*** -0.064*** -0.042*** -0.100*** -0.115*** -0.060*** -0.044*** 
 0.047 0.022 0.015 0.008 0.039 0.021 0.013 0.009 
Short-run adjustment                 
Coefficient (robust) -0.175*** -0.128*** -0.061*** -0.041*** -0.075** -0.115*** -0.060*** -0.033*** 
 0.051 0.023 0.019 0.008 0.037 0.023 0.015 0.005 
No Obs. 1557 1557 1557 1557 1550 1550 1550 1550 
RMSE 0.1336 0.3530 0.0730 0.2095 0.1420 0.3502 0.0755 0.2094 
t-bar () -3.266*** -2.454*** -3.121*** -2.321** -2.334** -2. 499** -3.101*** -2.432** 
Half-life (in months) 5.3 8.0 12.5 16.3 10.0 8.8 13.6 15.1 
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Table 3 (cont) 
 
Countries: Euro Area Core  
Cointegrating relation         
Pass-through estimate 0.859*** 0.940*** 1.001*** 0.966*** 0.847*** 0.993*** 0.958*** 0.974*** 
  0.011 0.032 0.024 0.051 0.019 0.039 0.027 0.053 
Short-run adjustment             
coefficient -0.259*** -0.132*** -0.084** -0.041*** -0.130** -0.103*** -0.074*** -0.044***  
  0.064 0.032 0.022 0.011 0.069 0.028 0.019 0.010 
Short-run adjustment             
Coefficient (robust) -0.257*** -0.132*** -0.085*** -0.035 -0.129** -0.102*** -0.075*** -0.034***  
  0.070 0.035 0.025 0.006 0.078 0.032 0.021 0.002 
No Obs. 865 865 865 865 862 862 862 862 
RMSE 0.1174 0.1981 0.0688 0.0906 0.1286 0.1969 0.0699 0.0907 
t-bar () -4.019*** -2. 742*** -3.817*** -2.519** -2.323*** -2.528** -3.382*** -2.652** 
Half-life (in months) 3.8 7.4 10.2 15.1 7.5 9.4 11.6 13.8 
Notes: The pass-through estimate is obtained from the pooled   estimate from equation (11) , short-run adjustment coefficient is obtained from the pooled i estimate from equation (11). Standard 
errors are given in italics beneath the coefficient estimates. The robust estimate ensures that the weight on each country is based on the proximity of the country observation to the average of all 
countries, reducing the influence of outlier observations compared to the non-robust estimates. No.Obs is the total number of observations used to estimate the pooled mean group estimator. RMSE 
is the root mean squared error of the regression. t-bar () is the unweighted average of the t-statistics on the short-run adjustment coefficient estimates (i). Half life is the time in months for a shock 
to the equilibrium relation to decay by half.  
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Pesaran–Shin–Smith pooled mean group estimates of interest rate pass-through 
using policy rates  Table 4 
 Short rate to NFCs Long rate to NFCs Short mortgage rate  Long mortgage rate  
Countries: Euro Area, UK and Denmark 
Cointegrating relation     
Pass-through estimate 0.835*** 0.907*** 0.973*** 0.794*** 
  0.015 0.065 0.023 0.034 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient –0.151*** –0.073*** –0.057*** –0.069*** 
  0.033 0.019 0.015 0.024 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient (robust) –0.144*** –0.062*** –0.032*** –0.032** 
  0.034 0.015 0.007 0.013 
No Obs. 1867 1891 1900 1891 
RMSE 0.1534 0.3603 0.1181 0.2063 
t-bar () -2.727*** -1.712 -2.585** -2.334** 
Half-life (in months) 6.3 14.3 13.6 9.7 
Countries: Euro Area 
Cointegrating relation     
Pass-through estimate 0.907*** 0.991*** 0.976*** 0.965*** 
  0.020 0.076 0.023 0.075 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient  –0.123*** –0.068*** –0.062*** –0.043*** 
  0.028 0.020 0.018 0.012 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient (robust) –0. 123*** –0.052*** –0.034*** –0.019 
  0.031 0.014 0.012 0.002 
No Obs. 1557 1557 1566 1557 
RMSE 0.1422 0.3598 0.0763 0.2084 
t-bar () -2.566** -1.795 -2.772*** -2.349** 
Half-life (in months) 7.9 15.4 12.3 15.1 
Countries: Euro Area Core 
Cointegrating relation     
Pass-through estimate 0.916*** 0.966*** 0.988*** 0.928*** 
  0.020 0.074 0.024 0.073 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient –0.172*** –0.090*** –0.094*** –0.048** 
  0.026 0.031 0.025 0.020 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient (robust) –0.172*** –0.060*** –0.095** –0.048 
  0.029 0.013 0.028 0.021 
No Obs. 865 865 870 865 
RMSE 0.1285 0.2026 0.0713 0.0926 
t-bar () -3.273*** -2.494*** -3.592*** -2.686*** 
Half-life (in months) 5.5 10.7 8.4 11.4 
Notes: See Table 3 
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Cointegration tests using the individual WACL components Table 5 
 Short-term Long-term 
 
MFI deposits Non-MFI deposits 
Short-term 
securities   MFI deposits Non-MFI deposits 
Covered 
bonds  
Long-term 
securities 
NFCs 
Persyn & Westerlund (2008)         
Gτ -0.109 1.440 -2.717***  -1.546* -2.073** -1.436* -1.808** 
Pτ  1.222 0.687 -2.295***  -2.783*** -3.209*** -2.795*** -1.391* 
Banerjee & Carrion-i-Sylvestre (2013)                
Zα -3.147*** -2.875*** -3.121***  0.303 -1.612 -2.001** -4.470*** 
Zαc -2.854*** -0.751 -2.666***  0.586 -1.875* -1.888* -4.075*** 
Mortgages 
Persyn & Westerlund (2008)         
Gτ -2.405** 0.356 0.061  -3.840*** -2.528** 0.392 -0.216 
Pτ  -2.798*** 0.411 -1.351*  -3.350*** -3.131*** -2.006** -0.952 
Banerjee & Carrion-i-Sylvestre (2013)                
Zα -3.650*** -3.268*** -2.673***  -0.310 -2.459** -0.667 -4.236*** 
Zαc 0.425 -0.740 -1.810*  2.631*** -1.831* -1.596 -3.860*** 
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Pesaran-Shin-Smith pooled mean group estimates of interest rate pass-through using the individual WACL 
components Table 6 
 Short-term Long-term 
 
MFI deposits Non-MFI deposits 
Short-term 
securities   MFI deposits Non-MFI deposits Covered bonds  
Long-term 
securities 
NFCs 
Cointegrating relation         
Pass-through estimate 0.792*** 0.903*** 0.703***  0.735*** 1.006*** 0.843*** 0.758*** 
  0.011 0.009 0.040  0.034 0.039 0.041 0.060 
Short-run adjustment                
coefficient -0.151*** -0.216*** -0.045***  -0.100*** -0.114*** -0.070*** -0.062*** 
 0.045 0.055 0.017  0.030 0.020 0.015 0.019 
Short-run adjustment                
coefficient (robust) -0.110*** -0.193*** -0.041***  -0.063** -0.112*** -0.068*** -0.049*** 
 0.024 0.068 0.017  0.012 0.022 0.016 0.018 
No Obs. 1867 1867 1867  1891 1891 1891 1891 
RMSE 0.1492 0.1552 0.1614  0.3574 0.3612 0.3611 0.3639 
t-bar () -2.948*** -3.918*** -1.484  -1.943* -2.045** -1.928* -1.472 
Half-life (in months) 6.6 4.4 22.9  10.3 8.8 15.3 16.8 
Mortgages 
Cointegrating relation         
Pass-through estimate 0.881*** 1.003*** 0.738***  0.817*** 0.744*** 0.726*** 0.752*** 
  0.024 0.024 0.037  0.035 0.047 0.026 0.045 
Short-run adjustment                
coefficient -0.051*** -0.086*** -0.030***  -0.061*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.038*** 
 0.013 0.030 0.009  0.020 0.013 0.021 0.013 
Short-run adjustment                
Coefficient (robust) -0.039*** -0.057*** -0.021***  -0.037** -0.048*** -0.019*** -0.014*** 
 0.015 0.012 0.010  0.009 0.015 0.003 0.002 
No Obs. 1891 1891 1891  1891 1891 1891 1891 
RMSE 0.1164 0.1115 0.1168  0.2048 0.2104 0.2031 0.2119 
t-bar () -2.522*** -3.135*** -1.755*  -2.605** -1.876* -2.121** -1.808* 
Half-life (in months) 14.9 8.8 26.4  11.4 13.4 13.2 18.3 
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Pesaran-Shin-Smith pooled mean group estimates of interest rate pass-
through using WACL for sub-samples (Euro area) Table 7 
 
Short rate to  
NFCs 
Long rate to  
NFCs 
Short mortgage 
rate  
Long mortgage 
rate  
Sample extends until global financial crisis (2003M1 - 2007M7) 
Cointegrating relation     
Pass-through estimate 1.040*** 1.182*** 1.000*** 0.949*** 
  0.020 0.090 0.034 0.055 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient -0.451*** -0.294*** -0.153*** -0.167*** 
  0.103 0.077 0.035 0.072 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient (robust) -0.389*** -0.299*** -0.152** -0.050*** 
  0.049 0.086 0.039 0.023 
No Obs. 432 432 432 432 
RMSE 0.0658 0.1914 0.0357 0.1307 
t-bar () -2.694*** -1.509 -1.873* -2.155** 
Half-life (in months) 1.7 3.1 4.8 4.1 
Sample extends until post crisis recession (2003M1 - 2008M8) 
Cointegrating relation     
Pass-through estimate 0.950*** 0.894*** 1.003*** 0.789*** 
  0.010 0.031 0.017 0.032 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient -0.429*** -0.379*** -0.132*** -0.170** 
  0.095 0.103 0.031 0.069 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient (robust) -0.363*** -0.385*** -0.110*** -0.138** 
  0.093 0.119 0.030 0.063 
No Obs. 549 549 549 549 
RMSE 0.0764 0.2090 0.0420 0.1469 
t-bar () -2.861*** -1.930* -2.459** -2.262** 
Half-life (in months) 1.9 2.4 5.5 3.7 
Sample extends until sovereign debt crisis (2003M1 - 2009M12) 
Cointegrating relation     
Pass-through estimate 0.916*** 0.783*** 0.811*** 0.697*** 
  0.010 0.025 0.015 0.023 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient -0.434*** -0.360*** -0.162*** -0.167** 
  0.066 0.078 0.050 0.066 
Short-run adjustment         
coefficient (robust) -0.426*** -0.359*** -0.147*** -0.104*** 
  0.072 0.085 0.049 0.035 
No Obs. 693 693 693 693 
RMSE 0.0941 0.2374 0.0536 0.1947 
t-bar () -4.173*** -2.596*** -2.612*** -2.735*** 
Half-life (in months) 2.0 2.4 5.1 3.6 
Notes: See Table 3 
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Appendix 
WACL Stock Measure 
The following measures of outstanding volumes were recorded: 
Deposit liabilities (in all currencies, and excluding the general government) vis-à-vis the euro area to 
MFIs and to non-MFIs, obtained from the ECB, which reports the MFIs aggregate balance sheet on a 
national basis (excluding the ESCB). For non euro area countries we use sources from national 
central banks.  
Debt securities, issued in all currencies in the euro area by the MFIs. This is obtained from the MFIs 
balance sheets, which also report breakdowns of maturities up to and over one year.  
Covered bonds, which are obtained from Dealogic. This component is only used for the long-term 
calculations, as we assume that all of the covered bonds have a maturity of more than one year.  
Funding from central bank operations. We only use this for the euro area countries. Liquidity 
provided by the central bank is a component that became important in the period after 2009. For 
the short-term, we include the amounts of the Main Refinancing Operations (MROs), while for the 
long-term we sum up the amounts of MROs and the long-term refinancing operations (LTROs).   
WACL Flow Measure 
The following items of flows were recorded: 
New deposits with agreed maturity for non-MFIs from the ECB record the deposit flows. Since there 
is no new deposits data for the MFIs, we approximated  this by multiplying the flow data of the non-
MFIs with the ratio between the outstanding amounts of interbank and private deposit liabilities.  
Data on debt securities is obtained from the ECB debt securities database, which reports the gross 
issuance by sector of securities other than shares for the short- (less than one year) and the long-
term (more than one year).  
The covered bonds gross issuance is obtained from Dealogic, which reports the gross issuance by the 
financial sector; this is used only in the long-term calculation.  
Weight Adjustments 
We assume that banks will use cheapest available funding, unless constrained, and will not borrow 
at rates above lending rates of the same maturity. At some points the cost of issuing debt securities 
exceeds the lending rate, therefore, we impose the condition that in this case securities will be 
funded by less expensive covered bonds rather than conventional bonds, which will be zero 
weighted. This produces an adjusted WACL. 
Funding from the central bank is often the cheapest available form of funding, but banks will not 
always borrow from this source rather than from depositors or bond holders if they are constrained 
by the availability of collateral.  
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Weight components of the short-term WACL1 
In per cent Table A1 
 MFI deposits Non-MFI deposits Short-term securities 
other than shares 
Central bank 
operations2 
 All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post 
Austria 37.9 38.8 37.4 60.3 58.6 61.3 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.5 0.4 
Finland 18.6 17.7 19.1 70.6 67.3 72.6 10.4 14.0 8.2 0.4 1.0 0.0 
France 46.5 47.2 46.1 46.0 44.2 47.1 7.4 8.6 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Germany 33.7 38.7 30.7 64.0 57.2 68.1 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.4 2.9 0.4 
Ireland 50.7 53.7 49.0 44.4 40.0 47.0 2.9 4.5 1.9 2.0 1.8 2.1 
Italy 36.6 40.5 34.3 62.6 58.4 65.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.5 
Netherlands 20.5 29.2 15.3 76.9 68.5 81.9 2.6 2.3 2.8    
Portugal 28.2 31.5 26.3 70.2 68.3 71.3 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.3 0.1 1.9 
Spain 24.9 25.9 24.3 72.0 69.4 73.5 2.0 3.2 1.3 1.1 1.5 0.8 
Denmark 35.2 30.2 38.1 64.0 69.1 61.0 0.8 0.7 0.9    
United 
Kingdom 
27.9 36.4 22.9 66.6 57.5 72.1 5.5 6.2 5.1    
1  All refers to all of the sample, pre-crisis is from January 2003 (depending on data availability) to August 2008; post-crisis is from September 
2008 to the latest data available.    2  ECB main refinancing operations. 
Sources: European Central Bank; national data. 
Weight components of the long-term WACL1 
In per cent Table A2 
 MFI deposits Non-MFI deposits Long-term 
securities other 
than shares 
Covered bonds Central bank 
operations2 
 All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post 
Austria 26.6 27.1 26.3 42.3 40.9 43.2 27.0 29.0 25.8 2.5 1.5 3.1 1.6 1.5 1.6 
Finland 15.0 16.9 13.9 57.5 64.1 53.5 20.8 16.3 23.6 5.4 1.2 7.9 1.2 1.5 1.0 
France 39.5 41.9 38.1 39.0 39.3 38.8 16.2 15.5 16.7 4.6 3.4 5.3 0.7 0.0 1.1 
Germany 23.3 24.0 22.9 45.1 35.5 50.9 20.9 23.4 19.4 8.8 14.3 5.4 1.9 2.8 1.4 
Ireland 40.0 42.5 38.4 35.1 32.0 37.0 13.3 16.0 11.7 5.5 5.7 5.3 6.2 3.8 7.6 
Italy 26.2 29.7 24.1 44.6 42.9 45.7 24.7 26.3 23.7 1.3 0.2 1.9 3.2 0.8 4.6 
Netherlands 14.8 21.9 10.5 53.9 50.7 55.8 25.7 24.6 26.3 1.8 0.6 2.5 3.9 2.1 4.9 
Portugal 22.3 27.5 19.1 55.0 59.6 52.1 13.9 10.9 15.8 3.7 0.8 5.5 5.1 1.2 7.5 
Spain 19.4 21.5 18.1 55.9 57.1 55.1 10.9 11.4 10.6 9.9 8.5 10.7 4.0 1.5 5.5 
Denmark 13.6 11.7 14.7 24.6 26.5 23.4 60.3 61.7 59.5 1.5 0.0 2.4    
United 
Kingdom 
25.0 33.5 19.8 58.6 52.8 62.2 13.9 12.9 14.5 2.5 0.8 3.5    
1  All refers to all of the sample, pre-crisis is from January 2003 (depending on data availability) to August 2008; post-crisis is from September 2008 
to the latest data available.    2  ECB main refinancing operations and long-term refinancing operations. 
Sources: European Central Bank; Dealogic; national data. 
 
45 
 
Interest rate components of the short-term WACL1 
In per cent Table A3 
 MFI deposits2 Non-MFI deposits3 Short-term securities 
other than shares4 
Central bank 
operations5 
 All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post 
Austria 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.57 2.77 0.86 2.31 3.33 1.72 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Finland 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.58 2.80 0.84 2.07 3.32 1.35 1.42 2.73 0.65 
France 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.63 2.81 0.93 2.04 3.29 1.30 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Germany 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.41 2.73 0.62 2.09 3.35 1.36 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Ireland 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.59 2.62 0.97 4.50 3.36 5.17 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Italy 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.88 2.47 1.52 2.72 3.31 2.38 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Netherlands 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.52 2.87 0.72 2.80 3.81 2.20 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Portugal 1.21 2.80 0.28 2.00 2.74 1.56 4.08 3.33 4.53 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Spain 1.21 2.80 0.28 1.93 2.80 1.41 2.86 3.35 2.58 1.42 2.73 0.65 
Denmark 1.29 2.89 0.35 1.43 2.11 1.01 2.23 3.41 1.54 1.24 2.96 0.25 
United 
Kingdom 
2.12 4.70 0.61 2.44 4.65 1.36 2.94 5.12 1.66 2.07 4.64 0.59 
1  All refers to all of the sample, pre-crisis is from January 2003 (depending on data availability) to August 2008; post-crisis is from September 
2008 to the latest data available.    2  Interbank overnight rates.    3  Deposit rate on euro deposits with agreed maturity for the non-financial 
corporations and households with maturities up to 1 year; if data not available close approximation to this rate.    4  The  
1-year interest rate swap plus the 1-year financial CDS for selected banks in each country.    5  Central bank policy rate. 
Sources: European Central Bank; national data. 
Interest rate components of the long-term WACL1 
In per cent Table A4 
 MFI deposits2 Non-MFI deposits3 Long-term 
securities other 
than shares4 
Covered bonds Central bank 
operations5 
 All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post All Pre Post 
Austria 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.11 3.15 1.48 3.36 4.02 2.96 2.46 4.02 1.52 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Finland 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.07 2.97 1.53 2.99 3.95 2.40 2.18 3.62 1.30 1.46 2.75 0.68 
France 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.41 3.02 2.04 3.04 3.93 2.51 2.44 3.74 1.65 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Germany 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.26 3.33 1.61 3.13 4.04 2.57 2.06 3.54 1.16 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Ireland 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.44 2.92 2.15 5.05 4.07 5.64 3.17 3.71 2.85 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Italy 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.00 2.35 1.79 3.76 3.97 3.63 3.02 4.20 2.31 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Netherlands 1.78 3.20 0.92 3.34 4.22 2.81 3.72 4.38 3.31 2.48 3.80 1.68 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Portugal 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.20 2.56 1.98 4.94 4.03 5.49 3.79 4.40 3.42 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Spain 1.78 3.20 0.92 2.10 2.70 1.74 3.91 4.01 3.84 3.33 4.01 2.92 1.46 2.75 0.68 
Denmark 2.03 3.33 1.24 1.43 2.11 1.01 3.20 4.04 2.69 2.24 3.36 1.55 1.30 2.96 0.29 
United 
Kingdom 
2.74 5.06 1.34 3.38 4.95 2.60 3.90 5.28 3.06 2.71 4.05 1.90 2.13 4.64 0.60 
1  All refers to all the sample, pre-crisis is from January 2003 (depending on data availability) to August 2008; post-crisis is from September 2008 
to end–2017.    2  Interbank 12-month rates.    3  Deposit rate on euro deposits with agreed maturity for the non-financial corporations and 
households with maturities over 1 year; if data not available, close approximation to this rate.    4  The 5-year interest rate swap plus the 5-year 
financial CDS for selected banks in each country.    5  Central bank policy rate. 
Sources: European Central Bank; Barclays; national data. 
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